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Abstract—Almost every website, mobile application or cloud
service requires users to agree to a privacy policy, or similar
terms of service, detailing how the developer or service provider
will handle user data, and the purposes for which it will be used.
Many past works have criticised these documents on account
of their length, excessively complex wording, or the simple fact
that users typically do not read or understand them, and that
potentially invasive or wide-reaching terms are included in these
policies. In this paper, we present our automated approach and
tool to gather and analyse these policies, and highlight some
interesting considerations for these documents, specifically those
surrounding past legal rulings over the enforceability of some
specific and widely-used contract terms — the ability for terms
to be changed without directly notifying users (and presumed
continued use indicates acceptance), and the protections in place
in the event of a sale or acquisition of a company. We highlight the
concerns these pose to user privacy and choice, and the extent to
which these terms are found in policies and documents from many
popular websites. We use our tool to highlight the extent to which
these terms are found, and the extent of this potential problem,
and explore potential solutions to the challenge of regulating user
privacy via such contracts in an era where mobile devices contain
significant quantities of highly sensitive personal data, which is
highly desirable to service operators, as a core valuation asset of
their company.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy policies, terms and conditions, and other legal
documents form a near-universal part of the experience of
using connectivity-based services today. Virtually every web-
site, mobile app, and even physical service provider has an
agreement of this form, to which users are required to agree,
in order to make use of the service. Often, however, these
agreements are stated to be implicitly accepted by accessing
or using a service, which gives rise to a number of consid-
erations surrounding the validity of these agreements. Online
agreements typically take the form of either a click-wrap [1],
or browse-wrap [2]. These names are derived from an early
form of software-related agreement, referred to shrink-wrap,
whereby a user was held to have accepted a software End
User License Agreement (EULA) by opening the shrink-wrap
seal on the physical packaging itself [3].
The premise of such agreements was originally that it
would be impractical for every user of a piece of software
to individually negotiate a contract of use with the company
providing the software, and record these agreements. As such,
the concept of offering a standard agreement, which users
accepted by using the software, was established. Such contracts
are very common, and when browsing the internet, users are
giving implicit consent.
Previous work has considered privacy policies, and proto-
cols for computer-readable representations of such policies,
such as P3P [4], allow web browsers to enforce a user’s
privacy choices. The automated processing of policies for the
generation of computer-readable policies has also been carried
out [5]. Despite P3P being a formally ratified standard of
W3C, it has seen little traction, and has been shown to be
abused by website operators [6] to work around restrictions
on their sites put in place by user privacy policies. Some basic
privacy-related enforcement is carried out in permissions on
mobile platforms and web browsers (and these are computer-
readable), although these focus simply on restricting access to
data, rather than on restricting its use, which was the primary
focus of the privacy policies we reviewed.
Other work has highlighted a major limitation of P3P
version 1, being that policies are only accepted or rejected,
without scope for partial acceptance or rejection, or feedback
to the service provider [7]. Privacy is a key consideration for
future network services and applications, as even the simplest
of software becomes increasingly connected, as it expands onto
users’ mobile devices (themselves holding large quantities of
personal information).
In recent years, the rise in the tendency for companies to
build their businesses around the prospect of making money
as a result of data gathered from the users of an (otherwise)
free-to-use service has been clear. Indeed, as Bruce Schneier
stated in a conference talk in 2010,“Don’t make the mistake of
thinking you’re Facebook’s customer, you’re not – you’re the
product,” [8]. With the rise in free (at point of use) services on
the internet, designed to encourage users to engage with them
for the purpose of gaining a larger user-base, which itself is
then used as an asset [9],
This paper firstly explores some legal precedents in contract
law which are relevant to the terms encountered in privacy poli-
cies. It then explores our approach to automated identification
of terms of interest within policies, as well as trends identified
through our analysis of privacy policies of popular services
and websites. Finally, we identify potential points for future
discussion and make a set of recommendations for ensuring
that users’ right to privacy is respected when using online and
mobile services.
II. LEGAL PRECEDENTS
A. Alterations to Contracts
In Douglas v. US District Court ex rel. Talk America,
(Case 06-75424), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that one party cannot unilaterally alter the terms of a contract.
The grounds for this were that modified terms remain an
offer to change the terms, until the terms are accepted. The
judgement also stated “In California, a contract can be proce-
durally unconscionable if a service provider has overwhelming
bargaining power and presents a “take-it-or-leave-it” contract
to a customer — even if the customer has a meaningful
choice as to service providers”, referring to the 9th Circuit
case of Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc. (69 F.3d 1257, 1283) in
California. This is of interest, as a large number of technology
companies are based in Calfornia, and make one of their terms
of use that the agreement is covered by US law.
The Douglas ruling specifically highlighted the questions
posed where a contract is modified, with the only notice given
by posting a revised version. This is of interest with regard to
the legal documents and privacy policies found on websites,
since of the top 10 websites we investigated, all except Amazon
contained a clause indicating that continued use of a service
indicated acceptance of the policy changes. The original case
of Douglas v. Talk America pertained to the enforceability of a
change in contract to add a mandatory arbitration clause. The
judgement discussed the impracticality of requiring a user to
check for updates to contracts or agreements for every service
they use, and highlighted that if a user was not aware of the
change, the user cannot agree to the offer for change unless
they are aware of it, per Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord,
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts.
When reviewing privacy policies of a number of popular
websites (as discussed in Section III), we identified that Google
was the only service to give a firm commitment to not reduce
privacy protections without obtaining “explicit consent” of
users. The majority of services made no specific commitment
to directly notify users (perhaps using a direct message, or an
email) of changes to policies, although many did state they
may do it in some cases, although we found (for the case of
Twitter, for example), that this was only if (at their own sole
discretion) they decided a change was material.
Clearly there is a balance to be obtained here between
notifying users of every single trivial change to a policy, and
allowing changes to policies to be made without specifically
contacting users. In light of the previously US-based legal
rulings covering such changes, however, we believe that there
is a strong argument to be made that all changes to website
terms or contracts should require explicit acknowledgement
and consent, to be binding.
B. Explicit Consent to Alterations
A second matter, however, covers implicit acceptance,
where continued use of a service, after its terms are up-
dated, or after a period of time, is taken by the company
to indicate agreement with the updated terms. In the case
of Nagrampa v. MailCoups, the court highlighted the over-
whelming bargaining power of one party over the other, and
that the alterations were presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it”
basis. Since alterations to website policies are typically carried
out as such (without provision made for users unwilling to
agree to the new terms), this ruling may prove relevant when
considering internet-based services, as the provider holds a
position of overwhelming bargaining power (by being able to
prevent a user from accessing their own data until they accept
new terms). We believe that this position may well form the
grounds for modifications to be deemed unfair, on account of
the imbalance of bargaining power between user and service
provider.
This is also inkeeping with UK unfair contracts law guid-
ance [10], which is itself derived from a European directive,
meaning that similar terms should exist throughout the Eu-
ropean Union. We believe that contracts between users and
service providers are inherently designed with an imbalance,
given the service provider is able to dictate that a user
accessing their own data (held on the service) must accept
new and modified terms, with the user having no clear option
to access their data without accepting those terms. Indeed, in
some cases, users may not need to even use the service, as we
found acceptance was in some cases presumed after a specific
period of time. This raises concerns for services where users
are not given a clear ability to remove all their data from
a service (and terminate their dealings with the company).
Another consideration here is whether it is fair or reasonable
for a user to no longer have access to a service, simply
on account of their objection to a unilateral modification to
the contract, which was not in place when they accepted
the agreement. Had they been aware of the intention of the
provider to make this change, they may never have used it, or
may have used an alternative.
C. Transfer of Data Following Acquisition
A common term seen within privacy policies and terms of
service covers the ownership (and transfer of) user or customer
data, in the event of the sale, acquisition or bankruptcy of the
company operating the service. These terms find their origins
as a result of a number of cases in the USA, where the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) successfully argued that a company
undergoing bankruptcy was bound by its original promises in
a privacy policy, such as to not sell private data, or to protect
it [11]. Specific examples include that of RadioShack and
Toysmart. While there has been considerable legal attention
given to the subject, online services are recognised as being
largely self-regulated, with regard to the handling of personal
data (through privacy policies), which is why the FTC seeks to
hold companies to account and ensure they honour their own
privacy policies [12].
As a result of this, it is common to see website and service
privacy policies clearly state that data may be transferred or
sold as part of a sale, bankruptcy or acquisition. By stating this
may happen, the company is acting within its own privacy
policy, and can likely continue with the sale unhindered.
Indeed, previous legal challenges brought forth by the FTC
have focused on holding companies to their own privacy
policies when attempts at selling user data are made, and in
the absence of legally binding protections for private data, it
appears acceptable for personal data to be sold as part of a
bankruptcy or acquisition, provided such a provision was made
in the privacy policy in question.
TABLE I. QUERY TERMS
Hyperlink Query String Page Content String
terms transfer
privacy acqui
legal merge
amend
modif
notif
In order to investigate the prevalence of these kinds of
terms, we present our analysis of a number of privacy policies,
accelerated through the use of our toolkit, used to identify
potentially interesting contact and policy terms for further
analysis. These policies belong to the most popular web and
mobile-oriented services.
III. AUTOMATIC PROCESSING
To gain a clear understanding of the extent to which
some of the concerns highlighted in Section II are found in
policies available today, we created a toolkit for the purpose
of analysing these policies. The toolkit accepts a CSV list
of top website domain names (the Alexa listing being one
widely known example of such a dataset). In order to simplify
analysis, at this point only sites using the ‘.com’ and ‘.co.uk’
top-level domains are considered, since these sites typically
feature their legal policies in English. In future, detecting
website language based on the page content would allow for
this to be expanded, and would allow for non-English website
policies to be processed, provided suitable policy definitions
were created for the language in question.
The identified websites were then accessed on their default
“www” subdomain prefix by our automated tool, and the
homepage was loaded into an HTML parser, which identified
all hyperlinks within the page containing a phrase relevant to
legal policies. These links were then followed, and the policy
documents gathered and scanned for strings likely to be of
interest in investigating the transfer of personal data, or the
alteration of policies. At this time, we used the phrases shown
in Table I, which were themselves selected from the top 20
websites.
IV. CHALLENGES IN AUTOMATED PROCESSING
In the process of carrying out this automated processing,
we identified a number of challenges when attempting to auto-
mate the process of extracting key privacy policy information.
Firstly, as discussed previously in Section III, we did not at
this point consider websites written in languages other than
English, although the process could be applied to websites of
any language, provided suitable experience was available for
identifying suitable query strings. Secondly, the challenge of
ambiguity in links was also identified, where a website may
contain more than one link mentioning “privacy” or “terms”.
We identified two potential approaches to handle this scenario.
One approach was to use the link with the shortest visible
text, since articles mentioning the query strings or other, more
generic pages about privacy tended to be qualified with other
words, such as “learn more about privacy”. The other was
to use the link which was found last on the page, since all
websites we investigated listed their privacy policy at the
footer of their page, which is conventionally (but not always)
listed towards the end of the HTML in a page. One other
potential challenge we identified (but did not encounter on
any of the most popular websites we investigated) was the use
of javascript-based hyperlinks to show a privacy policy. Since
these would require javascript code to execute in order for the
policy to display, retrieval of the destination of the hyperlink
would not show the policy. While we did not encounter this
on any websites we attempted to process, it would potentially
lead to the tool not detecting any relevant policies on the
page. For this reason, manual supervision of the acquisition
process remains necessary at this point, to ensure the policy is
identified correctly.
After identifying the relevant hyperlinks within a website,
we identified a number of challenges when attempting to auto-
matically process the policies themselves. While our process of
attempting to extract context of a query term by retrieving the
full HTML component within which the term appeared was
relatively successful, it was not always perfect. Specifically,
if a sentence was split (as is common when breaking up
lengthy legal statements using bullet points, or sub-sections),
the subsequent information was lost. To ensure that findings
were accurate for this work, we manually reviewed the relevant
terms of a policy (in its regular context of the full policy). By
also taking into account the variations in use of terminology,
fully automated processing of these privacy policies and other
legal documents remains a significant hurdle. Some relatively
common words (such as merge, or modify), are by definition
necessary to highlight for the purpose of identifying policy
terms of interest, and are also likely to be found in other
contexts (such as users being able to modify existing content),
or indeed within in-page javascript content to merge multiple
objects together when rendering the web page. The latter of
these were able to be removed using length filtering (to remove
infeasibly long lines of content), although parsing the string
as javascript to verify syntax also allows these false positives
to be removed.
V. KEY OBSERVATIONS
As a result of carrying out this investigation, we identified
a number of key findings, which should be considered in
line with the discussion regarding enforcement of terms in
Section II. Specifically, our findings lead us to believe that;
• Almost all online services deem continued use of
a service as acceptance of new terms or policies,
irrespective of whether the user is made aware of the
changes, which is potentially not in-keeping with legal
precedent.
• Very few services promise to directly contact and
inform individual users of changes to policies. Most
say they may do this, but some services may only post
a message on their service website, or perhaps only
even update the policy.
• Some services say they will notify users of major
changes to their policy, although this is as determined
by the company itself, and in some cases the terms
state that only the company may determine if a change
is major.
• Service operators may in a position such that rights
in a policy or contract could be found significantly
imbalanced — a user must agree to arbitrary terms
to continue to access their own data on a service,
and their access to that data can be terminated if they
refuse to consent to the new terms.
• Many services state in their terms that user data may
be transferred to another company in the event of an
acquisition, merger or sale. The privacy protections
experienced here may well differ from what users
expect, or previously were in force.
In the case of policy updates, we also believe that, on
account of the wide use of smartphone applications, not all
users will encounter a notice of a change placed on the
homepage of a service. For example, many users of Google
services on Android will have had an account created during
the Android setup process, potentially within a retail store,
and may not ever use (or know their password for) the web
interface for these services. Additionally, especially on mobile
devices, users are often prompted to accept policies without
necessarily having even seen the policy - due to screen space
limitations and the lengths of these policies, the policy was
often made available by way of a hyperlink, which upon
clicking would open a new screen containing the policy in
question.
A. Jurasdiction of Contracts
Another major consideration when reading privacy policies
and other legal documents, specifically pertaining to the usage
of internet services, is the jurasdiction under which contract is
governed. While most policies we found stated this, we note
that there can be considerable variation in legal protections
for users between jurasdictions. This is particularly clear when
US and European Union data protection laws are considered.
While the Safe Harbor process allows for companies to self-
declare their compliance with European law. This aims to re-
move the challenges faced with the EU’s comparatively heavily
regulated handling of private data (which is established as a
“fundamental right” [13]), in comparison with the relatively
hands-off approach taken in the US, where privacy protections
are typically implemented voluntarily by companies, in order
to prevent potential lawsuits [13].
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRIVACY
As a result of these observations, we present some rec-
ommendations to improve the fairness of privacy policies
for end-users. Firstly, we believe it essential that all users
are made aware of all changes to a privacy policy or other
legal document governing the use of provision of a service.
This notification should be made directly to the user, in
plain language, and in an honest and understandable way. We
recognise the trade-off between annoying users, and ensuring
they are informed of changes, but believe that given the legal
precedents discussed in Section II, it is necessary to ensure
users are definitely made aware of changes. In the meantime,
we believe there would be opportunity for a free service to
poll important legal documents of web services regularly, and
send a regular digest, notifying users directly of changes to
policies on services they indicate they use. We believe that
our approach to identifying these policies automatically from
a web page could be used to underpin such a service, by
comparing the text regularly, and alerting users if key words
were to be added or removed.
As an extension of the above, we recommend that services
should also seek explicit consent when updated terms or
policies are presented. This ensures that users have directly
consented to the variations in terms, and that there is no
presumption of consent. If a user no longer uses a service,
for example, their consent may be presumed when the user
was unaware of the alteration (and unwilling to agree to it). By
requiring explicit consent to all changes (perhaps at subsequent
logins, as some websites implement), service operators know
which users have consented directly to the changes, and can
separate user data which is not able to be used under the
updated policies..
Similarly, we recommend that the tie between agreeing to
new terms, and being able to continue to use a service which
has already been available presents a question and challenge
for further discussion. If a user is prevented from accessing
their data until they agree to a new set of policies, they are
arguably being unfairly pressured into agreeing to a change
in policies or contract. This could well be the equivalent of
being forced to sign an agreement under duress, which would
ordinarily invalidate it. Nonetheless, we recommend this topic
for further discussion, as it highlights the differing needs of
service users and providers. While service providers typically
wish to protect themselves from legal challenge, and ensure
their users understand the ways data may be used by the
provider, the user of a service wishes to understand how their
personal information is used, and to exercise control over this
to prevent use which they do not consent to. By being able
to balance these needs (perhaps through providing access to
the previously-offered service for compatibility), we believe
a satisfactory outcome can be achieved, such that service
providers may change policies, but users may continue to use
services which they are reliant upon, without being coerced
or forced into agreeing to something they are unhappy with.
When personal data is being handled, the ability to challenge
a change after the fact may not necessarily offer a satisfactory
remedy, since the personal data may already have been shared
or sold or otherwise used without the user’s consent, and it
cannot easily be “taken back” after the fact.
Finally, we recommend that existing standards (such as
P3P) for the machine-readable representation of privacy poli-
cies should be revisited, as they offer significant benefit for
those wishing to compare privacy policies between websites.
For this to be effective, however, it would be necessary
that service operators and websites be bound by their P3P-
stated policy, such that users may allow their browser to
make decisions based on website policies. If service operators
believed that their human-readable policies were the canonical
definition of their policies, this would potentially allow for
potential abuse, where sites would place incorrect P3P policies
on their site to mislead users into disclosing information under
false pretences.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed some of the legal and user-
facing considerations of privacy policies online, as well as
our approach to automatically locating them on websites, and
attempting to highlight important portions of these policies for
further review. Our approach has been used to automatically
flag sections of privacy policies for further review, which
appear to present clauses which act against the legal precedents
we explored. We presented a set of observations across our
analysis of many of these policies from some of the most pop-
ular websites on the internet, and have highlighted and made
recommendations with regard to specific concerns surrounding
presumed or implied consent to updated policies, and of the
notification of users to changes in such policies. We have also
highlighted and made recommendations regarding the all-or-
nothing approach to use of services, and the potential risks
of data lock-in being used to force users to agree to privacy
policy or other legal changes under what may be perceived as
duress.
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